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Leidschrift, jaargang 26, nummer 2, september 2011 
There have been considerable publications examining how the philosophy 
of religion, and Islam in particular, has developed in connection to political 
trajectories in the twentieth century and how we, as scholars, understand the 
dynamics of modern and contemporary religious politics. Following the 
post-modernist revision of construction of social knowledge, many authors 
reflected upon our usage of concepts of politics and religion. This article 
does not pursue a comprehensive review of this literature, but rather 
positions the existing debate on Islam in Soviet Central Asia within the 
broader discussion and approbates certain hypotheses on the available 
historical data. The vision of the interconnectivity in colonial and post-
colonial history1 and the nuanced approach of histoire croisée2  yet exist in 
ambivalent form in the field of Central Asian studies. This article aims to 
contribute to the development of studies on Islam in relation to late 
socialism by applying certain methodology offered by the above-mentioned 
scholarly concepts. 
The communists’ relation to religion and religious activists should be 
ultimately distinguished from the generally pronounced communist 
declaration of religion as opiate for people. Throughout the twentieth 
century not only political preconditions and social disarray determined the 
alliances between communists and representatives of religious elites at 
different levels (albeit in most cases temporal), but more often the complex 
interplay of identities and personal involvement of the communists into 
communal life fostered these pacts. Within the shared historical space of the 
twentieth century various groups and individuals in Central Asia allied not 
solely to the Western/Soviet communists for political gains, but saw the 
ideology of communism as grounds to signify their activities and create new 
social space inside their communities and beyond. This article focuses on 
institutions and people’s loyalties that developed beyond the official public 
anti-religious propaganda in Central Asia (namely Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, 
                                                     
* The author is grateful to Volkswagen Foundation for sponsoring the project The 
History of Perestroika in Central Asia. 
1  P. van der Veer, Imperial Encounters. Religion and Modernity in India and Britain 
(Princeton and Oxford 2001). 
2 M. Werner and B. Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison: Histoire croisée and the 





Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and with a special focus on Kazakhstan) within the 
last decade of the USSR’s existence and dwells upon theological and 
ideological relations between communism and Islam in the way they were 
understood and interpreted by the followers of these teachings. 
It has been noted by many scholars that Soviet secularism and 
Islamic reformism have shared not only a similar political platform of sharp 
anti-capitalist protest with its strategy and tactics of social mobilization, but 
certain ideological ground as well. For instance, the rationalist concepts of 
religiosity. While communism, as a genuinely Western ideology, took 
stimulus in European Enlightenment with its missionary idea, the reformist 
trends of Islam also accented on bringing light to the darkness of the world. 
The general notion about principle antagonisms between communism as a 
universal and futuristic concept and Islamic reformism as a particularistic 
one with its reference to the golden past still prevails. Nevertheless, while 
certain reformist trends have proved to be extremely particularistic, others 
accept the quest for individual interpretation of the sacred texts and certain 
socio-cultural innovations of the contemporary Western civilization and 
claim in the same way as the communists did (with a significant accent on 
field work) that they have the true vision of the progressive, forward-
looking society.3  
Some researchers (particularly Sovietologists) suggested that political 
Islam of the end of the 1970s until the beginning of the 1980s borrowed a 
lot from and was adulterated by totalitarian socialism to the extent that it 
could free itself from the formerly established alliance with communism and 
expose the evils of the former in the same way as the evils of capitalism. At 
present, the reformist Islamic organizations that operate on the territory of 
Central Asia, as for instance Hizb ut-Tahrir, (an Islamic party, which in its 
political programme aims at establishing Caliphate; so far its establishments 
are prohibited in some countries of Central Asia, as for instance in 
Uzbekistan) are in clear opposition to communist ideas and practices.4 Their 
ideologists point out that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union they 
                                                     
3 M. el-Kadhafi (Gaddafi), Le Livre Vert I (Paris 1976) 20. Cited by: G. G. Imart, 
Islamic and Slavic Fundamentalisms: Foes or Allies? (The Turkestanian reagent) 
(Bloomington 1987) 31. 
4 Programme by the political party Hizb ut-Tahrir, translated from English into 
Russian by A. A. Knyazev. A. A. Knyazev, Afganskii konflikt i radikal’nyi Islam v 
Tsentral’noi Azii. Sbornik materialov i dokumentov [Afghan conflict and radical Islam in 
Central Asia] (Bishkek 2001) 101. 




see no threat in communism any longer, and the activities of the present 
communist parties in Muslim countries have no effect.5  
Within this line the Hizb ut-Tahrir emphasis on the widespread 
nostalgia for the Soviet Union in Central Asia could be seen not solely as a 
tactical approach to framing social discontent,6 but something deeper. The 
concern about the USSR’s legacy is noticeable in the speeches of 
Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov: ‘the communist ideology – which 
lacks spirituality, is fanatical and anti-national in character – contributed 
greatly to the formation of the prerequisites for religious fundamentalism 
within post-Soviet space’. 7  Thus, the official Tashkent policies against 
reformist Islam could be better understood within the ongoing competition 
for the symbols and legacy of the socialist past. 
 
 
Central Asian Islam and communism in relation to nation-state prior 
to the Second World War 
 
Communism and Islam have been interconnected, above all, by modern 
nationalism. The notions of national and ethnic have been usurped or 
shared by the followers of both teachings. The stages of the history of Islam 
in Soviet Central Asia can be determined through the changes of its politics 
and interpretations of the idea of nation-state.8  
At the start of the short twentieth century, which next to the wide 
spread of communism also became recognized as the era of Asiatic 
Renaissance, the characteristic feature of the views expressed by practically 
                                                     
5  Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir (London, Khilafah publication) 74. Accessed via 
http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_books_pdf/Concepts.pdf . 
6  E. Karagiannis, ‘Political Islam in Uzbekistan. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’ in: T. 
Abbas ed., Islam and Education. Major Themes in Education. Vol. II. Education in Eastern 
Europe, Central Eurasia, South Asia and South East Asia (London and New York 2011) 
190-192. 
7 I. Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century (London 1997) 22. 
8 See, for instance: A. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central 
Asia (Berkeley 1998); M. Buttino, ‘Politics and Social Conflict during a Famine: 
Turkestan immediately after the Revolution’ in: M. Buttino ed., Collapsing Empire: 
Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalism in the Soviet Union (Milan 1993); A. 
Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton 2004); A. Haugen, 
The Establishment of National republics in Soviet Central Asia (Basingstoke 2003); D. T. 





all well-known Asian intellectuals was the idea of framing their social 
protest in nationalist discourse. Religious disputes were linked to 
nationalism, while the latter was often interpreted through the prism of 
communist rhetoric. 
The authors of Muslim reformism within the Russian Empire were 
educated in Western style by local intellectuals, who therefore unavoidably 
embedded the discourse on Russia’s unique historical path in their social 
programmes. On its part, Russia’s imperial administration had to re-
establish collegial relations with religious elites in the Muslim parts of the 
Empire in order to build a stronger alliance against domestic (Bolshevist) 
and external (pan-Turkish, pan-Islamic and Ottoman) threats. The imperial 
support for certain reformist concepts by Muslim intellectuals, 
predominantly Tatar, came in exchange for political and ideological loyalty 
and resulted in the spread of Europeanized Islamic education among 
Muslims of Central Asia (noticeable, for instance, in the establishment and 
success of mektebs, new method schools of Islamic education).  
Within the Russian Empire, inorodtsy (non-Russian nationalities) had 
only limited opportunities for political careers. At the same time, they could 
express their quests for modern identity through science and research up to 
the moment, when the spread of communist ideology presented them new 
ways to frame their social protest. 9  Religious reformism in Asian and 
Oriental societies inspired by the Bolshevik revolution in St. Petersburg, 
took peculiar forms via activities of Russia’s Muslim intelligentsia. Some 
scholars argue that the programmes of Bolsheviks and Islamic reformers 
(Jadids) overlapped considerably, and differed fundamentally only in the 
attitude towards religion.10 Other scholars have proved in a detailed record 
on how the Muslims allied with Bolsheviks that the attitude to religion was 
not the main focus of their disputes, at least at the most crucial first stages 
of the revolution.11 However, this discussion in historiography is unlikely to 
                                                     
9  See: I. Morozova, ‘Comparative Historical Analysis of Pan-Asiatic Social 
Movements in Central and Inner Asia. Z.V. Togan and E.D. Rinchino’, Journal of 
Central Asian Studies VII.2 (2003) 2-19. 
10 A. Khalid, Islam after Communism. Religion and Politics in Central Asia (Berkeley and 
London 2007) 65-71. 
11 S. M. Iskhakov, Rossiiskie Musul’mane i Revoliutsiya (Vesna 1917 – leto 1918) 
[Russian Muslims and Revolution (Spring 1917/Summer 1918)] (Moscow, 
Izdatel’stvovo ‘Sotsial’no-politicheskaya MYSL’, 2004). 




be resolved before we understand how Islam was practised and influenced 
by wider sections of the population. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, in Central Asia, Islam 
constituted an integral part of social life and politics. The indivisibility of 
religion and politics/state (din wa-dawla), always emphasized in Islamic 
intellectual tradition,12 was not within the scope of realization and interests 
of the communists in the 1910-20s. In general, the Bolsheviks viewed 
religion as just one of the political factors and contra-ideology. However, it 
became clear rather soon to the communist agents in the field (and via their 
reports to the Soviet policy-makers) that Asian religious communities 
required a different approach than the Orthodox Christian Church and any 
rapid assault upon the religion in Asia would only make the population 
hostile against the Soviet and revolutionary power.  
The rhetoric of the holy alliance of the 1920-30s between religious 
leaders and communists was grounded on the idea of national liberation. 
The alliance existed in between two world wars, presenting new 
opportunities for both religious elites and communists to develop their 
ideologies, and to their followers to gain a momentum and claim the 
positions of power. In Soviet Central Asia, particularly in the second part of 
the 1930s, the Islamic institutions and groups never totally disappeared, 
despite the official anti-religious campaigns and repressions. Regardless of 
the general speculative ideological statement on religion as an opiate of the 
masses, the communists throughout different periods of Soviet history had 
sought alliances with Muslims. After WWII the pacts became less easily 
recognised, since the interconnectivity between communists and Muslims 
was already so complex that no direct borderline could have been drawn.  
 
 
Institutionalization of the Soviet Muslims: the politics of SADUM 
 
In the 1940s a principal change occurred among Central Asian intellectual 
and religious elites at republican and municipal levels, which above all 
                                                     
12 The discourse on the absence of the distinction between religion and politics in 
Islam has been present in Western, Soviet and other historiographies. See, for 
instance: D.F. Eickelman and J. Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton 1996) 46-67. On 
modern theories of social knowledge within Islamic tradition see: A. S. Moussalli, 
‘Islamism: modernisation of Islam or Islamisation of knowledge’ in: R. Meijer ed., 





redefined their relation vis-à-vis Moscow. Soon after the beginning of 
WWII the Soviet leaders realised the importance of raising patriotic feelings 
among the people and they started to address ethnic and religious groups, 
diasporas, and wider sections of the population by calling them for a fight 
against fascism under the banner of Islam and national awakening. The 
communist leaders in Moscow strictly adhered to the policy of tight party 
control over the population and in particular those who might have had 
contacts with foreigners. At the same time, the attempts to supervise the 
revolutionary work among the oppositional groups in the neighbouring 
countries, especially Iran and Afghanistan, intensified during and after the 
war. As more Asian leaders decided to ally with the victorious USSR and a 
new wave of communist parties’ activities coincided with the post-war 
decolonization process, Soviet Muslims and Central Asian intellectuals had 
the intention to transnationalise and build up new networks at international 
levels. They used the USSR’s victory and had an ambitious goal to guide 
post-war ideological trends in the Orient and Asia. The repressive policy of 
Stalin on one side and the establishment of the bi-polar world system on the 
other did not bring those ideas to full realization, but nevertheless led to a 
principle change of the Soviet religious elites’ positions domestically and 
internationally. 
In 1943, the Central Asian Muslims received an opportunity to 
institutionalise within the newly established Spiritual Directory of the 
Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (most commonly known and 
referred to in the Russian abbreviation as SADUM). SADUM was not a 
genuinely Soviet invention; its prototypes can be traced back to Russia’s 
imperial history, when similar institutions had been established under 
Catherine II to reign over the Muslim population of the Russian Empire. 
Under the Soviets, local intellectuals and ulama (Muslim scholars) learned to 
adopt a secular rhetoric in the public sphere after the political campaigns 
and repressions of the 1930s and got a better chance to consolidate and 
form a new strata of state-appointed Muslims. By the time SADUM was re-
established, the survived ulama were dispersed in the rural landscape. So far, 
having their positions legalised and secured by direct linking to party organs, 
the leaders of SADUM received political means to influence and shape 
public spiritual and ideological life through official channels and build new 
elite networks of socialist Muslims. 
In the Soviet Union, the official Muslims managed to become strong 
competitors for the control of the institutions and interpretation of 




symbols.13  The journal Muslims of the Soviet East, which was published in 
Tashkent in a few Western and Oriental languages since 1968 and became a 
platform for promoting official discourses on Islam, elaborated in various 
forms that the idea of establishing SADUM belonged not to Stalin, but to 
the Muslims themselves.14 Another telling example of instrumentalisation of 
state institutions to launch a reform within Islam were the fatwa’s 
(authorised opinion on Islamic law by a representative of ulama) issued by 
SADUM. SADUM performed, as argued by some scholars, in an 
authoritarian way. The way, in which the fatwa’s were imposed upon the 
believers, was quite similar to how the Soviet government issued decrees.15 
Next to this authoritarianism (which, in fact, was not solely a Soviet 
invention), the fatwa’s became known for their reformist content.  
The intensified contacts between the ulama of Soviet Central Asia 
and the foreign Orient became characteristic for the period of Khrushchev’s 
Thaw. The ritual pilgrimage (hadj) to Mecca was regularly performed; and 
the new trends that had been appearing within Islamic tradition worldwide 
started penetrating Central Asia. Some religious leaders of SADUM were 
under great influence of Islamic reformism; other more conservative Sunni, 
did not welcome those trends. Remarkably, the two poles have not been 
ultimately antagonistic to each other. Their adherents, interconnected via 
numerous networks, including military, are also known to have claimed a 
Sufi identity.16 In perestroika times, particularly at the end of the 1980s, the 
Soviet Muslims were already enrolled in Islamic educational programmes in 
the Sunni Muslim countries, the regimes of which were friendly to Kremlin 
(such as Libya, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and others). The Islamic educational 
literature pieces published in Kazakhstan at the beginning of the 1990s bear 
                                                     
13 On these two foci of Muslim politics see: Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 
5-16. 
14 Musul’mane Sovetskogo Vostoka [Muslims of the Soviet East] 4 (Tashkent 1976) 2. 
See also: C. Poujol, ‘Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia: Democracy Versus Justice?’ 
in: I. Morozova ed., Towards Social Stability and Democratic Governance in Central Eurasia. 
Challenges to Regional Security (Amsterdam 2005) 52. 
15  B. Babadjanov, ‘From Colonization to Bolshevization: Some Political and 
Legislative Aspects of Molding a “Soviet Islam” in Central Asia’ in: W. Johnson, I. 
Popova ed., Central Asian Law: An Historical Overview, Journal of Asian Legal History 
(2004) 168. 





witness to very active contacts between the Muslims of the Soviet Central 
Asian Republics and the neighbouring Orient in the 1980s.17  
The reformist Islam became known to the wider public and took 
stimulus from this new ground, especially in urban areas. It was actively 
propagated from the top, as the high echelons of official Muslim 
administrations happened to be under great influence of reformist 
ideologies. As early as 1952 one the most famous leader of SADUM, mufti 
Ziyavuddin Babakhan, attempted to reform Islam and purify it from the 
false practices of Sufism18 that dared to interpret Qur’an and the Hadith.19 
The competition among different trends in Islam, as well as the 
dialectics of relationships between ecclesiastic authorities and believers, did 
not allow the Soviet fatwa’s to acquire any undisputable scriptural authority. 
Particularly since the 1960s they were not unanimously followed or precisely 
exercised by the believers. The ulama, of whom some representatives were 
more educated in Islamic theology than SADUM members, created 
channels to theologically debate the content of the fatwa’s through. Since 
perestroika they received an opportunity to express their position publicly, 
which they did vigorously,20 fighting to have more influence on the believers. 
Thus, the so-called revival of Islam in the beginning of the 1990s did not 
appear on an empty ground and did not fill any imagined vacuum, but 
paralleled the transformation of Central Asian societies in the period of late 
socialism. 
The time of Gorbachev’s perestroika was absolutely unique, as no 
religious institution had the power to claim full monopoly over communal 
spiritual life. Unfortunately, since the archive of the Tashkent-based 
SADUM is closed to the researcher, we can only presuppose what kind of 
complex competition within this organization took place. The Soviet 
SADUM began disintegrating and existed in its original establishment until 
1988. At the beginning of the 1990s, the rulers of the newly independent 
                                                     
17  A. J. Frank, Popular Islamic Literature in Kazakhstan. An Annotated Bibliography 
(Hyattsville, MD 2007).  
18 For a comprehensive record on the role of Sufism in present Central Asian 
societies see: B. G. Privatsky, Muslim Turkistan. Kazak Religion and Collective Memory 
(Richmond 2001).   
19 Babadjanov, ‘From Colonization to Bolshevization’, 163. 
20 See: B. Babadjanov, ‘The Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia (SADUM): 
Background and Consequences of Collapse’ in: M. B. Olkott and A. Malashenko 
ed., Multi-Dimentional Borders of Central Asia (Moscow 2000). 




Central Asian Republics had to find a way to stay in power and strengthen 
their legitimacy via re-establishing relations with religious groups. The 
discourse on Islam became once again (as had happened in regional history 
of modern times before) intertwined with the story of national awakening 
and rediscovering historical roots. The rhetoric on Islam and nation was 
used by certain political elites, whom in their anticipation of reform, were 
urgently searching for ideological ground and a new intellectual paradigm. 
First, the appellation to history and the call for re-conceptualizing history 
came from the top, produced by the party propaganda departments, and 
seemed to fit within the Soviet secularisation project. A lot of decrees by 
Republican governments on reconstruction of national historical 
monuments were issued in this period.  
It has been argued that secular politicians, but not the SADUM 
leaders, made key decisions on nationalization and ethnicisation of post-
socialist Islam at the beginning of the 1990s.21 However, the division of 
SADUM into smaller republic-centred bodies could have never happened 
without the Muslim leaders seeing a momentum to signify their roles as 
transmitters of true Islamic tradition within their national Republics. By 
January 1990 Kazakhstan, for instance, already had its own muftiate, the 
Religious Board of Kazakhstani Muslims, based in Almaty. As was shown 
by Allan Frank, the Board followed reformist trends in theological 
orientation.22 Also, research by Bahtiyar Babadjanov shows that already in 
the early 1990s the independent Uzbekistani SADUM had to upgrade the 
former Soviet SADUM’s policies towards Sufi practices and demonstrated 
more tolerance to people’s religion.23 The tendency to abandon the Soviet 
negative attitudes towards the quasi-religious superstitions of Sufi rites 
became noticeable in other Central Asian Republics as well: as shown by 
Frank, many prayer books in great numbers available in Kazakhstan (even if 
published in Uzbekistan) bear direct Sufi connections.24 The official Islam 
ideologists in Central Asian countries have deviated from propagating purity 
of Islamic practices in favour of people’s Islamic rites.  
Nevertheless, the main role in promoting the vision of Islam and 
nation unity belongs to the ruling elite. The Kazakhstani government 
                                                     
21 Babadjanov, ‘The Muslim Spiritual Directorate’, 63-66. 
22 Frank, Popular Islamic Literature, xviii. 
23 Babadjanov, ‘From Colonization to Bolshevization’, 164. 
24 Umrzoq hoji Zokirjon o’g’li and E. Yusupov ed., Qualities that Rest on Trayers 





affirmably attempted to nationalize the whole spectrum of popular Islam 
rather than letting religious organizations and reformist trends from abroad 
(be it Christian or Muslim) operate successfully in the country. For example, 
worshipping the holy places (mazar) acquired new meaning with the 
governmental efforts  to bring these places under the protection of the state 
(like in Uzbekistan). These policies reflect the continuity of the perestroika 
search for national heritage and claim to state protection over national 
monuments. The way this heritage is found, understood, conceptualized 
and taught at school is a reflection of a complex process of social 
transformation, rivalry for resources, as well as intense political competition. 
When nowadays the representatives of influential ulama create their 
stories of the late 1980s epochal turn, they create their story about the 
missionary role they played to unite Central Asian Muslims. Thus, the first 
mufti of the independent Uzbekistani SADUM Muhammad-Sodiq 
Muhammad-Yusuf has written that he, as well as other educated Muslim 
intellectuals in Central Asia, fought against the schism in Islam that became 
dangerously sharp at times of perestroika.25   
 
 
Central Asian Islam in transregional perspective: the impact of new 
international trends  
 
In the 1920s Bolsheviks attempted to adjust reformist trends within Islam 
to the universalistic and modernistic communist ideology. Since the 1960s 
communism, already at the retro-gradual stage, was adjusted to Islam, which 
is reflected, above all, in the politics of central Soviet authorities towards 
Muslim Republics. The Soviet Muslims did not question the superiority of 
socialism as state system, but they distinctly preferred to interpret socialism 
as a sort of secondary ideology that had originated from the teachings of the 
                                                     
25 Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf, Ikhtilofar haqida [On Conflicts]. Cited by B. 
Babadjanov, ‘Debates over Islam in Contemporary Uzbekistan: A View from 
Within’ in: S.A. Dudoignon ed., Devout Societies vs. Impious States? Transmitting Islamic 
Learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the Twentieth Century Islamkundliche 
Untersushungen 258 (Berlin 2004) 40-48. 




Prophet.26 For a long time this discourse had been developing on the pages 
of the journal Muslims of the Soviet East’  
At the same time, the Soviet Muslim elite was aware of the literature 
on the new reformist trends within Islam actively published in the 1970s 
until the beginning of the 1980s in foreign Muslim countries. They probably 
read Mustafa as-Sibai, who condemned communism as a teaching that 
continuously provoked the bloody class struggle and political purges and 
argued that only Islam could claim to be truly socialist (meaning fair) due to 
its divine nature.27 They might have also read one of the theoreticians of the 
Muslim Brothers, Sayyid Qutb, who categorically juxtaposed Islam to 
socialism as the divine order to the order established by humans, whom in 
their turn are imperfect and need guidance. 28  The general tendency in 
relations of Islam to communism as an ideology and socialism as a social 
system was moving drastically away from the holy alliance of the 1920-30s 
to polarization. Muslim activists and intellectuals were adjusting their 
teachings to communist ideology, to a more affirmative concept of Muslim 
religious politics. Such a relocation of positions within the world of Islam in 
Central Asia became possible due to the Cold War and the USSR’s relations 
to the Third World Muslim countries and the Soviet’s active 
communications to reformist Islamists in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa during Brezhnev and Gorbachev times.  
The late 1970-80s were marked by a new wave of writings on 
religious and communist ideologies. Particularly writers from Asia and the 
Orient highlighted comparisons of religious ideologies and communism, 
finding similarities in the Muslims’ and communists’ attitudes towards the 
holy book (Qu’ran and Lenin’s writings (Lenin’s Hadiths)) and the 
consequent interpretations and reinterpretations of these sacred texts. 29 
Other similarities, like rejection of the Rule of Law (the secular systems of 
                                                     
26 H. Bräker, ‘Die sowjetische Politik gegenüber dem Islam’ in: A. Kappeler, G. 
Simon and G. Brunner, Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien. Identität, 
Politik, Widerstand (Köln 1989) 143. 
27 As-Sibai Mustafa, Socialism of Islam (Damascus 1959) Cited by: A. A. Ignatenko, 
Halify bez Halifata. Islamskie nepravitel’stvennye religiozno-politicheskie organizatsii na 
Blizhnem Vostoke. Istoriya, ideologiya, deyatel’nost’ [Caliphs without Caliphate. Islamic 
non-governmental religious-political organizations in the Middle East. History, 
ideology, activity] (Moscow 1988) 130-132. 
28 Sayyid Qutb, Social fairness in Islam. Cited by: Ignatenko, Halify bez Halifata, 133. 





legislation) and a call for active position and struggle against imperialism 
and colonialism have been pointed out.30 A special reading of historical 
events based on loyalty a priori to (Islamic or communist) dogmas and 
axioms and a strong belief that the Prophet and Lenin came to this world to 
eliminate slavery and exploitation were dwelled upon as characteristic for 
the ideologies of Islam and communism.31 This literature marked a new 
stage of Asian scholars’ (including religious scholars) reflections upon their 
previous and contemporary relations to communism and suggested that 
communism and Islam were not two opposing, but rather competing 
ideologies. It was only the USSR’s dissolution that temporarily blurred these 
discussions.  
As a result of the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan even the former 
allies tended to associate the Soviet Union and socialist system with a wrong 
ideology and another adversary to the Muslim society socio-political system. 
These discussions were well known and understood by the top Soviet 
Muslim administration. As rightfully noticed by Catherine Poujol, the 
Western scholars of Central Asian Islam somehow overlooked those trends 
within the Soviet Islam.32 On the other hand, they did not pass completely 
unnoticed by intelligence organizations, which, on their side, were often not 
well informed and ill- or misinterpreted many events, adding to the 
bottomless well of the Cold War ideological myths.33  
Since the beginning of the 1990s and up until now reformist trends 
within Islam and democratic ideology are equally not accepted and seen as a 
threat (despite the de jure proclamation of Central Asian Republics as 
democratic states) to the former Central Asian nomenklatura and 
conservative SADUM leaders. This reflects in the current nation-centric 
historiographies of Central Asian Republics: for example, the Jadid 
movement has been highlighted as a unique national Islamic reformist 
movement in Central Asia. Vanished into the past, Jadidism does not 
appear threatening at present, on the contrary, as the nationalist character of 
                                                     
30 Naipaul, Among the Believers, 157, 78, 109, 149. 
31 Ibidem, 32, 219, 134-135. 
32 Poujol, ‘Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia’. 
33 See, for instance: Imart, Islamic and Slavic Fundamentalism. 




Jadids is emphasized (particularly in Uzbekistan), the reminiscences of 
Jadidism serve for the legitimacy of the ruling political elite.34  
 
 
Beyond the official institutions 
 
The late perestroika time was characterised by free competition among 
various religious groups and ideologies. That was the time of real pluralism 
on the conceptions of what true Muslims identity was and what constituted 
correct Muslim behaviour. In the 1980s, as in the 1920s, the most bizarre 
ideas on what religion meant for an individual and society occurred. 
Discussions about the relation of religious philosophy to the achievements 
of modern science reappeared. Certain political concepts like pan-Islamism 
also surfaced. 
The non-official discourse on Islam and resistance to fatwa’s 
intensified the awareness of the believers about their religious loyalties. In 
the 1980s, the generation of urban Central Asian Muslims educated in the 
secular tradition painfully reflected upon their lack of knowledge about their 
past, tradition, and religion. The section ‘Letters by the readers’ in 
republican newspapers and journals of perestroika times reveals those 
moods very vividly. The strong demand for knowledge and guidelines on 
Islamic faith resulted in mass publications of primers and other works 
addressing the basics of Islamic doctrine and practice, treaties outlining 
Sunni dogma, as well as translations of original Wahhabi texts by Saudi 
theologians. As noted by Frank, in the 1980s and early 1990s many of those 
works constituted a sort of secularly oriented guide to Islam,35 targeted at 
secular Kazakhstani seeking trustworthy information on the foundation of 
Islamic faith. The eruption of interpretations of Islam, supported and 
promoted by various parties, became particularly sharp in Uzbekistan, 
where calls for the establishment of a Caliphate were pronounced.  
The Soviet state politics in relation to Islam in Central Asia created 
one more paradox: by supporting the existence of certain official forms of 
religious practice to a certain degree, it turned many people against that 
religious officialdom. By limiting the scope of religious authority, the Soviet 
                                                     
34 Rediscovering Jadidism has been especially exemplary in Uzbekistan. See, for 
instance: S. Agyamhodyhaev, Turkiston Muhtoriati [Turkistan Autonomy] (Tashkent 
1996). 





policy helped those religious practitioners who had been marginalized and 
not fully represented in public life before, as for instance female religious 
figures.36 Under the slogan of the revival of traditions, many people got an 
opportunity to claim a part of religious authority. The whole discussion 
about tradition, pre-Islamic folk beliefs and Islam of the late 1980s-
beginning of the 1990s reflected the new relocation of positions and new 
regrouping for people who wished to play an active role in the society at 
local, translocal, republican and transregional levels.  
In the situation of numerous public discussions and interpretations 
of religion and tradition and the loss of state supranational ideological 
authority (of the communist party) the role of local communal spiritual 
leaders became particularly unique. Even before perestroika there was 
restriction, but no tough control over religious communal activities, 
especially since the party members and state officials turned into practicing 
Muslims, when participating in celebrations of household life cycle rituals 
(birth, marriage and mourning feasts). Since the 1960s it became even 
possible, albeit unofficially, to run a maktab in one’s house. The actual 
existence of unofficial Sufi brotherhoods (tariqas), parallel mullahs (a cleric in 
a local mosque educated in Islamic theology) in kolkhozes (collective 
farms),37 as well as self-appointed mullahs and imams was not unnoticed, but 
tolerated by the Soviet authorities, as long as communist party members 
responsible for decision-making were involved in the social life of their 
communities, which was largely centred to Islamic rites. In the second part 
of the 1980s, in particular after 1987, when religious ceremonies became 
officially recognized and allowed by the Soviet state, religious activities went 
beyond any centralized control due to their great amounts, variety of forms 
and numbers of people involved. Lots of mosques and madrases began to 
appear.  
 
                                                     
36 See: H. Fathi, ‘Gender, Islam, and Social Change in Uzbekistan’ in: Abbas, Islam 
and Education, 157-173. 
37 Roy, The New Central Asia, 152. 








The entrepreneurial self-appointed spiritual leaders provided their 
disoriented fellow-citizens with ideological and social orientation, and 
formed the special strata of post-socialist popular religious and spiritual 
 
Ill. 2: The visit of a newly married couple to the new central mosque 
of Astana: a bizarre combination of Muslim and secular Soviet cults. 
Picture taken by Irina Morozova, July 2011. 
 
Ill. 1: The new central mosque in Astana. Picture taken by Irina 





activists. These strata of popular religion and occultism practitioners grew 
during the first years of independence, and won a certain niche in society 
and demonstrated amazing continuity by reproducing new generations of 
commercial spiritual wizards, claiming supernatural power and providing 
services to the population. More purely religious Muslim activists, who 
published their appeals to the believers and the population, condemned the 
social success of these strata, warning Muslims not to give credence to 




Conclusion. ‘Hall of mirrors’ in historiography  
 
As has already been admitted in the recent historiography, our knowledge 
of Islam in late socialist Central Asia has been under great influence of Cold 
War ideological biases on the causes of the USSR’s disintegration. Not only 
political clichés, but also all-catching notions on ethnicity and culture have 
formed this lexicon, with which scholars repeatedly try to approach the 
problems of late socialist transformations. For instance, it has been 
generally taken for granted that the Soviet secular society could not resolve 
ethnic conflicts and cultural tensions without reform. However, the notions 
of reform are projected and anticipated from the present.  
Many publications in local Central Asian press in the 1980s reveal the 
communist party members’ concern of a possible threat coming from the 
alliance of Islam and nationalism.39 Noticeably, at the start of the 1990s, the 
same apparatchiki were constructing the opposition between national 
patriotism of local ethnic groups and above-ethnic policies of reformist 
Islamic ideologies. Certain ideas of religious reformism, based on supra-
national identity, which had been especially clearly pronounced at 
perestroika times, later started being suppressed actively by the 
governments of the newly established states. 
                                                     
38 Müzaffar Quttiqozha uli Qarashayiq ed., The Prayers of the Prophets and the Sacred 
Qualities of the Sura “Ya-Sin” (Turkestan 1997). Cited by Frank, Popular Islamic 
Literature, 23. 
39 Based on the content analysis of provincial Kazakhstani newspapers (Kommunistik 
enbek, Ortalyk Kazakstan and Enbek tuy) published in 1982 (made by Saltanat 
Orazbekova).  




The Western states’ officialdom, media and academia enthusiastically 
supported the accent on ethnicity in the nation-building policies of the 
Central Asian governments. In the same way as the Bolsheviks after 1917 
had allied with Muslims of the former Russian Empire on the ground of 
nationalism, in the second part of the 1980s, with the launch of perestroika, 
democracy was intertwined with nationalism and explained as the right 
political system that would legitimately favour various nationalistic and 
religious expressions. At that time Central Asia was already open to Western 
scholars, whose voices acquired among Central Asian intellectuals special 
meanings of truth, previously unknown and hidden, but suddenly re-
discovered correct interpretations of the region’s history and contemporary 
development. 40  These scholars promoted the vision of the ‘formerly 
oppressed ethnic, national and religious feelings of the Soviet Muslims’.41 In 
most works by them, Islam (except for the official Islam) was seen as 
brutally oppressed religion and Muslim intellectuals as potential rebels 
against the Soviet power. Those Cold War times’ interpretations of Islam 
were at their peak during perestroika and had an utterly deep effect on the 
local discourse in Central Asia, including academic discourse. The rhetoric 
of the oppression, long anticipated awakening and national liberation is still 
a priori present in contemporary Central Asian historiographies. 
Paradoxically and still not properly reflected upon, those Western 
conventions on Soviet Islam were produced based on the information 
available in the Soviet press and thus on the writings by Soviet journalists 
and scholars. Although the very recent Western historiography attempts to 
overcome those stereotypes, they become more grounded and reproduced 
in the national historiographies of Central Asian Republics. This ‘hall of 
mirrors’42 is continuously reproduced as our reflections upon late socialism 
                                                     
40  On the apologetic promotion of the liberal ideology of free market and 
democracy by Central Asian scientists and intellectuals (on the example of 
Kyrgyzstan) see: S. Amsler, The Politics of Knowledge in Central Asia (London and New 
York 2009).  
41 H. Carrere d’Encausse, Muslims of the Soviet Empire. A Guide (London 1985); C.W. 
Hostler, The Turks of Central Asia (1993); H. B. Paksoy, ‘Basmachi Movement from 
Within: Account of Zeki Validi Togan’, Nationalities Papers 23.2 (1993) 373-399; M. 
Rywkin, Moscow’s Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (London 1982). 
42 M. Saroyan, ‘Rethinking Islam in the Soviet Union’ in: E. W. Walker. Minorities, 






change under the influence of the current socio-political and cultural 
transformation. 
